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In Job God implies that he, unlike his interlocutor, can catch 
Leviathan on a hook.l Maybe it is presumptuous for mortals to 
suggest that the actions of government can be disciplined by fine 
legal distinctions devised by human artifice. Michael McCon-
nell's article, however, asks us to try.z McConnell's historical 
claims are ably discussed elsewhere.J I will try to improve our 
understanding of a technical legal point on which the argument 
for Brown rests: the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment, 
within its area of application, forbids all race-respecting rules, 
rather than just those race-respecting rules that do not treat peo-
ple of different races symmetrically. If that is true, and if public 
education is a privilege of state citizenship, then the argument in 
favor of Brown is very strong.4 My approach to this question will 
be a bit roundabout, but I think the detour will be a fruitful one. 
As to the specific problem of separate but equal, my suggestion is 
that proponents of Jim Crow-type laws, which discriminate by 
race but do so symmetrically, may have believed that their under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment better accommodated 
the fundamental fact that the amendment does not refer to race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude. I think that argument 
is incorrect, however, and if the amendment does indeed yield 
some kind of ban on race discrimination, its text is most plausibly 
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Barry Cushman, and Michael Klarman provided helpful comments. Some of the analysis 
here seeks to improve on my last attempt to understand the relationship between equality 
and non-discrimination. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992). 
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read as a ban on all such distinctions, with no exception for sym-
metrical discrimination. 
I. EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 
Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment involves two differ-
ent kinds of constitutional rules: those that require equality 
among all persons (or all citizens), and those that forbid discrimi-
nation. Although these are thought to be closely related, they 
exhibit important differences. 
A. EQUALITY AS A SIDE EFFECT OF RULES 
How might the Constitution go about requiring that all citi-
zens be treated the same with respect to some subject matter? 
One approach would be simply to lay down rules concerning that 
subject matter. Such rules, if put in universal form, will produce 
at least one description under which everyone is the same.s If 
the rule is that the Ministry of Fruit must give everyone an apple, 
and the rule is complied with, then everyone will be the same as 
to the question, whether one has been given an apple. If the rule 
is that no one may commit arson (or sleep under a bridge), then 
everyone will be the same as to the question whether one is al-
lowed to commit arson or sleep under a bridge. To continue in 
that vein, all individuals have the same jury trial right under the 
Sixth Amendment in that there is a formulation of the jury trial 
provision that applies to everyone. 
With sameness, of course, comes difference. If everyone is 
given one apple, it is very likely that people will differ as to the 
extent to which the government has satisfied their hunger for ap-
ples. If everyone is forbidden to commit arson, people may differ 
in the extent to which the government has forbidden their liveli-
hood; it is a cliche to point out that under the bridge law people 
will differ in the extent to which the government has kept them 
from sleeping where they would like to sleep. Moreover, there 
can be difference within sameness-some people may get bigger 
apples than others, and vagueness about sameness-if A receives 
an apple and B receives the halves of two different apples, it may 
not be clear whether they have both received an apple. 
5. Almost all rules can be put in universal form. A rule that forbids people over 
seven feet tall from riding motorcycles, and might be said not to apply to shorter people, 
can be replaced with the rule that says that everyone, if over seven feet tall, may not ride 
a motorcycle. If the distinction seems pointless, remember that all that is required is 
universal form. 
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The important point, though, is that rules can easily produce 
sameness under some description without mentioning sameness 
or equality. Anyone in 1866 who actually thought that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lished certain rules of private law for American citizens also 
thought that it established the same rules of private law for all 
American citizens; on some description that would have been 
right.6 Rules that by their terms apply to everyone, or all mem-
bers of a specified group, produce equality of a kind among the 
people to whom they apply. 
B. REQUIREMENTS OF EQUALITY 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was being drafted, how-
ever, it was generally agreed that the federal Constitution should 
not establish private law for the States, or empower Congress to 
do so. The States were to be left with much of their discretion as 
to private rights. One way to describe the Republican program is 
to say that the States were to retain their discretion concerning 
private law but were to lose the power to classify their citizens; 
they could still determine what the rights of citizens were to be, 
but they had to give those rights to everyone. 
One form of rule is often thought to correspond to that con-
dition: everyone must be equal as to X. The rule, "the Ministry 
of Fruit must give everyone the same number of apples," has that 
form. The Equal Protection Clause also has that form: no State 
may deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. "Everyone must be equal as to X," can be called a 
universal equality rule. Such rules have several noteworthy fea-
tures. First, as students of normative equality theory know, the 
important work is done in the conceptualization of XJ That con-
ceptualization provides the description under which everyone 
must be the same. Its residue gives the ways in which they may 
be, and to some extent must be, different. 
Second, as that last sentence suggests, some universal equal-
ity rules are nonsense. "Everyone must be equal as to X," can-
not be complied with for some X's. It is possible to provide for 
everyone the same number of apples (even if that number has to 
be zero). It is almost certainly not, however, possible to provide 
for everyone the same outcome on the subject of apples. Again, 
6. It is possible that this is what Earl Maltz means by a rule that provides limited 
absolute equality. See Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, The Constitution, and Congress, 1863-
1869 at 4 (U. Press of Kansas, 1990). 
7. See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 12-28 (Harvard U. Press, 1992). 
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if everyone is given the same number of apples, people will differ 
in the extent to which their apple hunger is gratified. "Everyone 
must be equal as to everything," which means that everyone must 
be the same (or must be treated the same) on every description, 
is thus nonsense.s Difference in, difference out. A corollary to 
this point is that just as some universal equality rules are impossi-
ble to comply with, others are trivially easy to comply with. 
"Everyone must be the same in some way" is an example of the 
latter category. 
Third, universal equality rules entail more specific equality 
rules. If everyone must be given the same number of apples, 
then individual men and women must each be given the same 
number of apples. If all citizens must be given the same number 
of apples, then black and white citizens must each be given the 
same number of apples. The point can be formulated in more 
familiar terms this way: if no distinctions may be drawn among 
persons (or citizens) with respect to the number of apples they 
are given, then distinctions may not be drawn among persons (or 
citizens) on the basis of race, color, sex, age, height, or anything 
else, with respect to the number of apples they are given.9 
So far I have been interchanging equality among individuals 
under certain descriptions and rules that are universal in form 
and can be seen to treat everyone the same in some way. I have 
run together the requirement that everyone be given the same 
number of apples with the rule, "give everyone the same number 
of apples." In that simple example, X is a concept with a rela-
tively clear application as to equality among individuals, 
although it is still a little vague. For purposes of constitutional 
law, we are most interested in universal equality rules with the 
form, "everyone must have the same X," where X describes 
some body of legal "rights"-that is, of legal positions as de-
scribed from the standpoint of that individual. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause says that all persons are to have equal protection 
of the laws; the Privileges or Immunities Clause, by saying that 
the privileges and immunities of citizens may not be abridged, 
implies that they must be the same.w In those provisions, X is 
the protection of the laws or the privileges and immunities of 
8. The more familiar way to put this point in constitutional law is to say that a ban 
on legal classification cannot be complied with, because all laws classify. 
9. Moreover, if no distinctions may be drawn among persons with respect to the 
number of apples they are given, no distinction may be drawn between citizens and aliens 
in that respect. 
10. I move back and forth between sameness and equality because equality is same-
ness under some description and the descriptions are provided. 
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CitiZens. (I assume for purposes of this discussion that the pro-
tection of the laws and the privileges and immunities of citizen-
ship consist of formal legal positions, not practical outcomes.) 
Such statements about people's rights often must be trans-
lated into statements about the laws that produce those rights. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause, for example, applies to the 
right to make contracts and therefore has implications for con-
tract law. One way of putting the point is to say that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, because it requires that all citizens 
have the same right to contract, requires that the law of contract 
be the same for all citizens. Formulated that way, it of course 
runs the risk of vacuity: there will always be some formulation 
under which the law of contract is the same for everyone. 
If requirements of universal equality as to certain legal rights 
are to have interesting implications such as forbidding Black 
Codes, as the Privileges or Immunities Clause was thought to do, 
they must go beyond requiring that the relevant legal rules be 
capable of being cast in universal form. They must also require 
that the legal rules be universal in form when expressed in parti-
cular ways. Consider the rule under which only freed slaves are 
punished for loitering. In its universal form, that rule says that if 
one is a freed slave, one may not loiter. In its non-universal 
form, it says that one may not loiter, but does not apply to every-
one. If Black Codes are forbidden by a requirement of universal 
equality as to the criminal law, it must be that the rule is properly 
understood as a ban on loitering, not a ban on loitering if one is a 
freed slave. 
The move from universal equality to meaningful constraints 
on government action thus rests on limitations on the permissible 
characterization of legal rules. This is X again-everyone must 
be equal with respect to the legal rules and the legal rules must 
be the same for everyone, when the rules are described in some 
particular way or some limited number of ways. If one actually 
wanted to impose a rule of universal equality on an area of law, 
the key would be to explain which descriptions of the relevant 
legal rights or the relevant laws count and which can be ig-
nored-which are the descriptions under which everyone must 
be the same and which are the descriptions under which people 
can differ. Legal rules, one might say, have some natural form 
that captures their essence. Expressed in that form, they must be 
the same for everyone if universal equality is to be achieved. 
On this reading, proper application of the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause requires inquiry, 
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not into equality, but into the natural formulation of the protec-
tion of the laws, or the privileges and immunities of citizens. One 
would want to know why a ban on loitering is natural whereas a 
ban on loitering if one is a freed slave is not, or why the ordinary 
rules of real property are natural but become unnatural if they 
limit the ability of black citizens to own property in towns. This 
will not surprise theorists of equality, who know well that the 
problem is describing the space as to which equality is required. 
It will also not surprise students of the Supreme Court's equality 
jurisprudence, who know that when the Court departs from 
treating the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of antidis-
crimination rules, it finds itself inquiring into permissible and im-
permissible government purpose. If a requirement of universal 
equality with respect to legal rights is to be neither vacuous nor 
impossible to comply with, it must rest on a theory of the proper 
form of legal rights and the rules that establish them. 
C. DISCRIMINATION 
Requirements of universal equality find their content in the 
answer to the question, "equality as to what?" in the specifica-
tion of X. That specification must take into account that some 
forms of universal equality are simply impossible. Universal 
equality on matters related to apples is impossible in the world as 
we know it. There cannot be universal equality with respect to 
many subject matters. 
Rules forbidding discrimination do not have that limitation. 
Bans on discrimination of the kind I am interested in concern the 
criteria used in making decisions; as applied specifically to legal 
rules, they concern the criteria contained in the rules. A rule 
requiring that the rules on voting not take sex into account is an 
antidiscrimination requirement. This is the kind of rule that 
McConnell is talking about. He maintains that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause forbids the States from using racial criteria in 
the rules that relate to the privileges or immunities of citizens. 
Rules that forbid discrimination can and usually do differ 
from universal equality requirements in an important way: an-
tidiscrimination rules can address an entire subject matter. It is 
possible to have a set of rules about voting that never require 
inquiry into sex. It is sensible to say that the rules about apples 
are not to discriminate on the basis of sex. If the general form of 
an antidiscrimination rule is, "do not take criterion Y into ac-
count in rules on subject matter X," then the conceptualization 
of X can be different from the similar X in a universal equality 
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rule. "The rules on the subject of voting must be the same for 
everyone," is either nonsense or means something other than 
what it seems to mean on its face. 
If the Fourteenth Amendment were like the Fifteenth 
Amendment and explicitly forbade discrimination, it would be 
much easier to apply. But it is not, and we are stuck with the 
problem of understanding how a requirement of universal equal-
ity can be thought to forbid some kinds of discrimination. That is 
the conceptual difficulty created by the people who adopted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and then adopted the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause to underwrite 
it. 
II. UNIVERSAL EQUALITY AND RACE-
RESPECTING RULES 
A. THE PsYCHOLOGY oF JIM CRow 
It may seem that the Jim Crow approach, which permits sep-
arate-but-equal, avoids the puzzle I just described because it rests 
directly on universal equality, without requiring the move to non-
discrimination. Universal equality as to X imposes a kind of 
sameness that is defined by the specification of X. It permits dif-
ference in whatever is not part of the definition of X. Consider 
the rule, "all children shall enjoy equal per capita education ex-
penditures, calculated with respect to the school they attend." 
"Per capita education expenditures, calculated with respect to 
the school attended," is the relevant X. The equality rule with 
respect to it can be complied with in a system of racially segre-
gated schools. Students of all races can have the same per capita 
educational expenditure. They will be equal in one respect, dif-
ferent in others. 
Of course, the relevant universal equality rule probably will 
not be that specific. It might say, for example, that all students 
shall enjoy an equal education. If that rule is to make sense, 
however, it must be capable of being recast in some more partic-
ular form, because no two students' educations can be equal in 
every regard. The form of equality sought by segregated educa-
tion was equality with respect to quality of education, as 
measured by various objective criteria. Segregation of common 
carriers was similar: the segregated cars were supposed to be 
equal in certain ways. No one could expect them to be the same 
in every way, because no two things are the same in every way. 
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It seems likely that approval of race-respecting, but ostensi-
bly equal laws, usually rested on an answer to the question, 
"equality of what?" To use terms more hospitable to the nine-
teenth century, the separate-but-equal approach offers citizens of 
all races the same rights, with the rights conceived in certain 
ways, but, of course, not others, because citizens cannot have the 
same rights in every way. If the principle is put as generally as 
equality of legal rights, the work is done by the characterization 
of the legal right. 
This observation makes it possible to understand parts of the 
segregation debate that are otherwise unclear. It helps explain 
why, for example, counsel for Sarah Roberts in Roberts v. City of 
Boston made the point that the black school was farther from her 
home than the nearest white school.ll They were seeking a for-
mulation of the right that could plausibly be universalized: every 
student (and it follows, every student without regard to race or 
color) shall attend the school nearest her home. It also helps ex-
plain Chief Justice Shaw's emphasis on the discretion of the 
school board in determining what kind of education to give Sarah 
Roberts.12 He wanted a universal characterization of what all 
students were equally entitled to that did not entail integration. 
The focus on X, on the legal right involved, also clarifies the 
discussion of segregation on the floor of Congress itself. During 
the debates on an early version of what became the 1875 Act, a 
proponent of integration pointed out that a black Senator had 
not been required to sit in a segregated corner of the room. No, 
responded a supporter of separate-but-equal, because a Senator 
has a right to be on the floor (and of course all Senators have the 
same right to be on the floor).13 Implicit in that response was 
that Senators have a right to be anywhere on the floor they want 
to be. If a Senator simply had the right to a seat somewhere on 
the floor, segregation would have been permissible. The specifi-
cation of the right does the work. 
B. THE LOGIC OF JIM CROW 
What I have just suggested is in part conceptual history, 
designed to provide an insight into the way people thought about 
very complicated matters. It might also be more than that; it 
might also have implications for legal analysis. On the basis of 
11. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198,203 (1850). 
12. !d. at 208-09. 
13. McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. at 988-89 (cited in note 2) (citing Cong. Globe, 42d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872)). 
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this observation about the connection between universal equality 
and separate-but-equal, a proponent of Jim Crow legislation 
could claim that McConnell lacks a solution to the fundamental 
problem of the Fourteenth Amendment: he cannot explain how a 
universal equality requirement can produce an antidiscrimination 
requirement. It is indeed difficult to explain that derivation 
given the important differences in logical structure discussed 
above. Defenders of separate-but-equal, by contrast, could 
maintain that under their approach black and white citizens have 
the same rights as a mere logical corollary to the principle that all 
citizens have the same rights. All the work is done by the formu-
lation of the right. In the school cases, all children have an equal 
right to education of a certain quality. That form of universal 
equality is, on certain factual assumptions, consistent with racial 
segregation. It is also probably consistent with segregation in all 
sorts of other ways too. 
Is that how separate-but-equal really worked, as a concep-
tual matter? I think not. On the contrary, the Jim Crow system 
was subject to the same impeachment that applies to McConnell: 
it too purports to derive a conclusion about the distinctions that 
may be made in legal rules from a premise of universal equality. 
Consider bans on interracial marriage, the form of separate-
but-equallaw that was most seriously discussed during the fram-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under such a ban, all citizens 
are subject to the same race-respecting rule: people may marry 
only individuals of their own race. Defenders said that such a 
rule was acceptable even though a rule that forbade black citi-
zens to marry would not be. They explained that the difference 
was that an antimiscegenation rule was the same for everyone. 
By itself, that is no explanation; under some description, every 
rule will be the same for everyone, and hence for people of dif-
ferent races. What is also true about an antimiscegenation law is 
that it is a race-respecting rule of a particular form: it has racial 
symmetry. 
A requirement that race-respecting rules be symmetrical, 
however, is just as much about the use of race-respecting criteria 
as a McConnell-like ban on race-respecting rules altogether. It 
permits some race-respecting rules but forbids others: a law pro-
viding that whites may marry after a one-day waiting period but 
that people of other races may marry only after a one-week wait-
ing period would violate a symmetry requirement.J4 If this is 
14. One interesting feature of this example is that it is not even clear who is being 
favored. From the standpoint of the parties' convenience, whites are. One could also 
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what Jim Crow means, it cannot claim unproblematic derivation 
from the Fourteenth Amendment's universal equality require-
ment as to the protection of the laws, and its requirement of 
equality among citizens with respect to their privileges and 
immunities. 
To see this point, consider waiting periods. If the racially 
asymmetrical rule on waiting periods is invalid under a universal 
equality requirement, that must be because the right to marry 
after one day and the right to marry after one week are not the 
same right to marry. Evidently, then, the waiting period is part 
of the right to marry expressed in its natural form. This is odd. It 
implies, for example, that minors could not be subject to a longer 
waiting period than adults.1s On the other hand, if the racially 
symmetrical rule on marriage is consistent with universal equal-
ity, then the natural formulation of the right to marry does not 
include the ability to marry a black person, because not everyone 
has that right. One might think such a formulation is perfectly 
natural, on the theory that marriage has nothing to do with race, 
until one realizes that the Jim Crow proponents think that the 
ability to marry someone of your own race is part of the right to 
marry, because they say that under the symmetrical but race-re-
specting rule everyone has the same right to marry-the right to 
marry someone of one's own race.l6 
It is difficult to explain how a requirement of universal 
equality as to legal rights, or some subset of legal rights, has sys-
tematic consequences for race-respecting rules.11 That is true 
whether the race-respecting rules are symmetrical or not. 
account for the distinction on the theory that the government is less concerned about 
whites, and hence will permit them to marry in haste and repent at leisure. 
I also should note that I do not deal here with the argument that the symmetrical 
rules I am talking about are not race-respecting at all because, for example, one can ask 
whether marriage partners are of the same race without asking what their races are. That 
argument does not appeal to the constitution's apparent use of universal equality rules. 
15. One might think that under the system that distinguishes between adults and 
minors, everyone does have the same right to marry, because everyone has the right to 
marry after the one-day waiting period upon attaining one's majority. That, however, 
involves a different formulation of the right to marry: it includes age-respecting rules. If 
so, why does it not include race-respecting rules? 
16. Another way to defend the ban on interracial marriage would be to say that race 
does indeed have nothing to do with marriage, in that choice of the race of one's marriage 
partner is not part of the right at all, and therefore may be freely regulated by the state. 
But that is separation without equality; it would permit a rule that forbids black citizens 
but not white citizens from marrying Asians. 
17. It is easy to lose sight of this difficulty because universal equality rules, as noted 
above, do seem to have antidiscrimination implications: if everyone must have the same 
right to own property. then black and white individuals must have the same right to own 
property. The gulf remains, however, because the latter rule still depends for all its con-
tent on the formulation of the right to own property. The requirement that the laws on 
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c. THE TEXT 
Let us assume that we have made the leap from universal 
equality to some regulation of race-respecting rules on the sub-
jects of privileges and immunities of citizens and the protection 
of the laws. That is no small leap, but it also was made by the 
people who adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause. If the Constitution does indeed reg-
ulate the use of racial classifications, which is the more 
persuasive account of the text: that it forbids race-respecting 
laws, or that it forbids them only if they are asymmetrical?Js 
The argument in favor of Jim Crow goes like this: The Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause forbids abridgements on the basis of 
race. Abridgement is about reduction, and so must be under-
stood in terms of more and less. In order to tell whether some-
one's privileges have been abridged on the basis of race, one 
compares an individual of one race with an otherwise-identical 
individual of another race and sees whether one of them has less 
by way of legal rights than the other. Under a ban on interracial 
marriage, for example, the answer is no. If one compares other-
wise identical black and white citizens (or citizens of any two dif-
ferent races), one finds either that they have the same right-the 
right to marry someone of their own race-or that they have 
rights that are different-the right to marry a black person and 
the right to marry a white person-but that the difference does 
not represent an abridgement because neither right is greater 
than the other. 
That seems to me to be the same sleight-of-hand as last time: 
it requires that we adopt a particular characterization of the right 
involved, and therefore forgets that antidiscrimination rules are 
usually about subject matters rather than rights in any particular 
formulation. If we ask whether the black citizen's right to marry 
a white person has been abridged on the basis of race, the natural 
answer is yes. If we compare that black citizen with an other-
wise-identical white citizen and ask if the former's right to marry 
a white person is less than the latter's, the answer is yes. As for 
this idea of substituting one right for another, so that the right to 
marry a person of your own race makes up for the inability to 
property ownership not discriminate on the basis of race does not require any particular 
formulation of the right. It is about a subject matter, not a particular set of legal rules. 
18. In this connection it is more fruitful to concentrate on the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause than on the Equal Protection Clause. It is hard to think of many interesting 
race-respectmg, but symmetrical, rules that concern the protection of the laws; moreover. 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the natural home of the debates over marriage and 
segregation. including school segregation. 
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marry a person of another race and leaves you with the same 
quantum of rights as someone of another race, it works by ap-
pealing to a particular metric in measuring people's rights. That 
way of thinking is appropriate to universal equality, not 
nondiscrimination. 
III. ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
One response to my argument about the text is that it shows 
how ridiculous originalism is. Leviathan cannot be caught on any 
human hook, and it is silly to argue that great questions like pub-
lic segregation turn on what we find by examining a 130-year-old 
document with a conceptual electron microscope. That objec-
tion, however, does not go to originalism. It applies just as well 
to closely parsing a 32-year-old document, like the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The objection is rather to legal formalism, to which 
I plead guilty. lntentionalists, original and otherwise, will be un-
comfortable with any reading that introduces such shearing 
forces between what the adopters of a provision thought they 
were doing and what they turn out, on close analysis, to have 
done. 
In fact, the debate about Brown is not mainly about original-
ism. It is mainly about constitutionalism, about the practice of 
being ruled by this particular written document. A non-original-
ist who thought that the Constitution was the supreme law most 
likely would say that the document should be understood as if it 
had just been ratified. To say that Brown is correct under such a 
canon is to say that in 1954 the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have been understood to forbid school segregation. If the non-
originalist constitutionalist is also an intentionalist, the question 
is whether, had the document been adopted in 1954, the people 
would have wanted it to outlaw school segregation. It is far from 
clear that they would have. One thing that is clear is that people 
who in 1954 wanted to outlaw school segregation, and make sure 
they had done so, would not have proposed the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause and certainly would not have proposed the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
A non-originalist textualist assessing Brown would use argu-
ments a great deal like those I have used. A reading under which 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is about equality, and hence 
perhaps about nondiscrimination, was as available in 1954 as in 
1866. Moreover, my argument about the relative merits of a 
complete ban on race-respecting laws and a ban only on asym-
metrical race-respecting laws was as available in 1866 as in 1954. 
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My argument uses only the concepts of general equality and non-
discrimination, ideas we know were in circulation back then. 
If a textually identical Constitution adopted in 1954 would 
not have produced the result in Brown, then the question that 
case raises goes to the authority of the written constitution, 
whatever its vintage. That question is separate from, and much 
more important than, the question whether the text should be 
understood as of some date. If it is silly to be governed by James 
Madison's or John Bingham's intentions, it is almost as silly to be 
governed by their words. 
